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1. Introduction 
 
There is a wide consensus in the literature about the properties an inequality measure 
has to satisfy when using it to compare income distributions having the same mean. 
Basically, it is necessary to invoke the symmetry axiom—which warranties 
anonymity—and the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers—which requires a transfer of 
income from a richer to a poorer person to decrease inequality.
1 However, if we are 
interested in comparing two income distributions that have different means, we need to 
specify the type of mean-invariance property we want our inequality indices to satisfy. 
This implies the need to introduce another judgment value into the analysis, and there is 
no agreement among scholars with respect to this matter. Some opt to invoke the scale 
invariance axiom, so that the inequality of a distribution will be unaffected when all 
incomes increase (or decrease) by the same proportion. This is the approach followed by 
the relative inequality indices. Others prefer instead to call on the translation invariance 
axiom, under which inequality remains unaltered if all incomes are augmented (or 
diminished) in the same amount, thereby giving rise to the absolute inequality measures. 
However, as Kolm (1976) pointed out, some people may prefer an intermediate 
invariance approach between these two extreme views. He labeled such an inequality 
attitude as “centrist”, against the “rightist” and “leftist” labels he used to term the 
aforementioned relative and absolute notions, respectively. 
  
So far, the intermediate and absolute inequality indices have rarely been applied for 
ranking income distributions, since these measures are cardinally affected by the 
currency unit in which incomes are expressed. In a recent paper, Zheng (2007) invokes 
a new axiom, the unit consistency axiom, requiring that inequality rankings between 
income distributions remain unchanged when all incomes are multiplied by a scalar. In 
this new scenario, not only relative measures, but also absolute and intermediate 
measures that satisfy the unit consistency axiom, appear as plausible options in 
empirical research.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of several 
intermediate inequality measures, paying special attention to the unit consistency 
                                                 
1 Properties such as normalization, continuity, differentiability, and replication invariance are also 
commonly invoked, but they are of a more technical nature.   3
axiom. First, we demonstrate why one of the most referenced intermediate indices, that 
proposed by Bossert-Pfingsten (1990) (B-P hereafter), is not unit-consistent. This 
analysis allows us to show that the problem lies in the iso-inequality criteria behind that 
index, which helps us explain why the decomposable intermediate inequality measures 
à la B-P proposed by Chakravarty and Tyagarupananda (2000) do not satisfy unit 
consistency either, as shown by Zheng (2007). Second, we show that the intermediate 
measures proposed by Kolm (1976) do not cover the whole intermediate space and, 
also, that they may violate unit consistency.  
 
2. Unit consistency and intermediate inequality measures 
 
 
In order to ensure independence of the unit of measurement without imposing scale 
invariance, Zheng (2007) introduces the following property into inequality measures:
2 
 
Unit consistency. For any two distributions  , y
n x ++ ∈ℜ  and any inequality measureI  
( 2 :
n
n I ≥+ + + ℜ→ ℜ ∪ ), if  ( ) ( ), then  ( ) ( ) for any  Ix Iy I x I y θ θθ ++ << ∈ ℜ . 
 
Certainly, any relative inequality measure satisfies the above property since they are 
defined as those where  ++ ( ) ( ) for any  Ix I x θ θ =∈ ℜ . However, we should keep in mind 
that there are other unit-consistent indices, apart from the scale invariant ones. In this 
vein, as shown by Zheng (2007), the variance and the “fair compromise” measure 
proposed by Krtscha (1994) are absolute and intermediate indices, respectively, that 
satisfy this property. In what follows, we analyze several intermediate inequality 
equivalence criteria by distinguishing between linear and non-linear invariances.  
2.1. Linear invariance criteria 
 
The µ -inequality concept proposed by B-P is the intermediate inequality measure most 
frequently mentioned in the literature. According to this invariance criterion, an 
intermediate inequality index should satisfy the following condition for a given 
[ ] 0, 1 µ∈ : 
                                                 
2 Zoli (2003) also proposes an analogous property named “weak currency independence”.   4
[ ] (( 1 ) 1 )
n Ix Ix x µµ τµ µ ⎡ ⎤ =++ − ⎣ ⎦ 
 for  any  2, ,  and  ,
n nx τ ++ ≥∈ ℜ ∈ ℜ  such that  (( 1 ) 1 )
nn xx τµ µ ++ + +− ∈ ℜ, where 
1 (1,......,1)
n ≡ . As shown in Figure 1, for a given income distribution 
2 x ++ ∈ℜ ,  the 
distributions which are µ -inequality equivalent to it are those located on the line 
defined by point x and vector  (1 )1
n x µ µ +−  (which represents an intermediate attitude 
between the relative ray given by  x and total equity given by 1
n ). In particular, 
() () I xI y µµ = .  
 
Figure 1.  Invariance in B-P ( 2 ,  =0.25 n µ = ) 
 
By using a numerical example in a five-dimensional space, Zheng (2007) showed that 
the decomposable intermediate inequality measures à la B-P, characterized by 
Chakravarty and Tyagarupananda (2000), are not unit-consistent. By using the same 
distributions, we can prove that B-P’s index also violates the above axiom. In fact, if 
0.5 µ = , (1,2,3,4,5)  and  (0.1,0.1,0.2,0.6,0.6) xy == , then 
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In Figure 2, we illustrate why this popular intermediate inequality equivalence criterion 




Figure 2. Unit consistency in B-P ( 2 n = ,0 . 2 5 µ = ). 
 
Thicker dash lines represent the two µ -invariance lines passing through points 
 and 2 x x , that is, the set of distributions equivalent to  and 2 x x , respectively. Vector 
y  represents an income distribution that is equivalent to x, since it is located on the 
invariance line of the latter. It is easy to see that any distribution between  y  and z  has 
a larger inequality level than x because of the Pigou-Dalton transfer axiom. However, 
distributions resulting from doubling their individual incomes (which are located 
between2  and 2 yz ) would have instead a lower inequality level than distribution 2x. 
Therefore, changes in the currency unit affect rankings between income distributions.  
 
The above graphical analysis permits us to illustrate that the aforementioned five- 



















dimension space, for any given income distribution it is possible to find an interval of 
distributions that violate the axiom when comparing them with the former distribution. 
The explanation of this behavior relies on the notion of inequality equivalence proposed 
by B-P. The slope of the inequality invariance line given by direction   (1 )1
n x µ µ +−  
does depend on the total income of distribution x. In fact, keeping the relative 
inequality as constant, the larger the total income, the larger this slope (the slope of the 
invariance line corresponding to 2x is larger than that of x, as shown in Figure 2).
3 
This means, first, that µ  may represent a different intermediate inequality attitude 
depending on the distribution in which the index is evaluated. Since the invariance lines 
are, therefore, not parallel, it is impossible to state that µ -inequality rankings are not 
affected by changes in the scale when comparing any two distributions. Thus, we have 
shown that the heart of this equivalence criterion is incompatible with the unit 
consistency axiom, so that any measure based on this notion violates this axiom.  
 
Second, the µ -inequality concept approaches the “rightist” view of inequality when 
aggregate income rises.
4 This means that results obtained by using this intermediate 
concept can be quite close to those obtained with relative measures, which can be seen 
as unsuitable for a “centrist” measure. In fact, in Figure 3, which shows the µ −iso-
inequality contours corresponding to distribution  (20,80) x =  for two parameter values, 
we see that the invariance line corresponding to  0.5 µ =  is roughly indistinguishable 
from the ray passing by x (which defines the iso-inequality line of relative measures). 
Moreover, to obtain an iso-inequality contour closer to the “leftist” view, it would be 
necessary to choose a parameter value extraordinary low (for example  0.005 µ = ).
5 
 
                                                 






−−, as shown by B-P), it is 
possible to construct inequality indices based on this invariance notion. If the two lines cut in the first 
quadrant, the index would not be well-defined. 
4 This tendency to the relative ray was initially pointed by Seidl and Pfingsten (1997) and Del Río and 
Ruiz-Castillo (2000). 
5 This explains why Atkinson and Bradolini (2004) find similar empirical results either by using B-P’s 
index or relative indices, even when considering extremely low  values µ −  
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Figure 3. Iso-inequality contours corresponding to distribution ( ) 20,80 : Linear cases 
 
If one is interested in defining a linear centrist measure as a convex combination 
between a relative and an absolute ray, one could fix not only parameterµ , but also the 
reference distribution that gives rise to the “rightist” and “leftist” views. In this regard, 
Del Río and Ruiz-Castillo (2000) (DR-RC hereafter) propose the ( ,  v π )-inequality, 
where    v is a vector belonging to the n-dimensional simplex, and  [ ] 0, 1 π ∈ . The first 
component fixes the distribution of reference, while the second refers to the convex 
combination between the relative and absolute rays associated to v.
6 Once these two 





απ π ⎛⎞ =+ − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
, which defines the direction of the inequality equivalence ray, 
and the set of income distributions 
'() α Γ  for which α  represents an intermediate 
attitude. This set can be expressed as follows: 
                                                 
6 We have changed their original notation to make it clearer. In particular, we have switched vector x  by 
simplex vector v , since only the income shares of the distribution of reference are required to obtain the 
invariance ray.   8
' 1
( ) :  (1 ) , for some  [0, 1]
n
xx x x xD v
n
απ π α π
⎧⎫
Γ= ∈ + − = ∈ ⎨⎬
⎩⎭
, whereD is the set of all 
possible ordered income distributions, and  x v  represents the vector of income shares 
associated to  x (it therefore belongs to the n-dimensional simplex). 
 
In this vein, an intermediate inequality index is ( ,  v π )-invariant in the set of income 
distributions 
'() α Γ  if for any 
'() x α ∈Γ  the following expression holds: 
(,) (,) (,) () () ,  f o r  a n y    () vv v I xI y y P x ππ π =∈ , 
where  (,)
1
() :  ( 1 ) ,  
n
v Px y D y x v
n
π τπ π τ
⎧⎫ ⎛⎞ ⎪⎪ =∈ = + + − ∈ ℜ ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟
⎪⎪ ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭
 represents the inequality 
invariance line. Note that this line is obtained as the convex combination π  between the 
“leftist” and “rightist” views associated with vector v (and also with any other 
distribution that has the same income shares than v), which means that invariance lines 
are always parallel (see Figure 4).  
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Therefore, the ( ,  v π )-invariance notion does not have the problem shown in Figure 2, 
which can help explain why the family of indices based on this approach, proposed by 
Del Río and Alonso-Villar (2007) (DR-AV hereafter), does satisfy the unit consistency 
axiom. The invariance lines corresponding to three of these indices are shown in Figure 
3, where  { } ( ) 0.25,0.5,0.75  and  0.2,0.8 v π ∈= . We can see that  0.5 π =  leads to an iso-
inequality contour which is “equidistant” from the “rightist” and “leftist” views of   
distribution  () 20,80 , when choosing the vector of reference, v, as that given by the 
income shares of that distribution. 
 
2.2. Non-linear invariance criteria 
 
An alternative to the above intermediate notions is to assume that the iso-inequality 
contours are not straight lines. In this regard, Krtscha (1994) proposes an adaptive 
intermediate notion that gives rise to parabolas. According to his “fair compromise” 
notion, to keep inequality unaltered, any extra income should be allocated among 
individuals in the following way. The first extra dollar of income should be distributed 
so that 50 cents goes to the individuals in proportion to the initial income shares, and 50 
cents goes in equal absolute amounts. The second extra dollar should be allocated in the 
same manner, starting now from the distribution reached after the first dollar allocation, 
and so on. This index [and the generalizations proposed by Zheng (2007)] does satisfy 
unit consistency, as shown by the latter. This “centrist” attitude is rather challenging 
since it approaches the absolute view rather soon when income increases, which makes 
it difficult for inequality to decrease when analyzing an economy over time. In Figure 5, 
we can see that, according to Krstcha’s index, inequality would remain unaltered with 
respect to distribution () 20,80  if the poorer reached an income of 400 and the richer of 
590, which would imply income shares of 40% and 60%, respectively.  
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Figure 5. Iso-inequality contours corresponding to distribution ( ) 20,80 : Non-linear cases
7 
 
Kolm’s (1976) “centrist” measures also lead to iso-inequality contours that are not 
straight lines. As opposed to Zheng’s family of indices, Kolm does not cover the whole 
intermediate space since, as shown in Figure 5, “centrist” attitudes are close to the 
“leftist” view, while those near the “rightist” view are not permitted for any parameter 
value.
8 On the other hand, Kolm’s “centrist” measures may violate the unit consistency 
axiom when  0 ξ ≠  (if  0 ξ =  the index is homogeneous of degree 1 and, therefore, it 
does satisfy the axiom). In this regard, if  10 ξ =  and  10 ε = , for distributions 
                                                 
7 Kolm’s family of indices has iso-inequality contours that monotonically approach the absolute ray as 
either ξ  or ε  increases (if  1 ε > ). However, when  [ ] 0,1 ε ∈ , there is no monotonicity with respect to 
this parameter. In this example, the contour closer to the relative ray is that corresponding to 
0, 0.75 ξ ε ==. 
8 Recent empirical evidence obtained by Atkinson and Brandolin (2004, p. 13) seems to support this idea: 
“Kolm’s centrist measure basically confirms the pattern shown by Kolm’s absolute measure”.   11
(2,2,6,7,7) x =  and  (2,2,3,8,8) y = , it follows that  (10,10) (10,10) ( ) 1.63 1.66 ( ) I xI y = <=  


















=+− + ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ∑ . Therefore, ( ) , ξ ε -inequality rankings may be 
affected by currency units. 
 
 
3. Final remarks 
 
The unit consistency axiom, recently invoked by Zheng (2007), guarantees that 
inequality rankings between income distributions remain unaffected by the unit in 
which incomes are expressed. This axiom does not impose such strong value judgments 
on inequality measurement as the scale invariance condition and, therefore, intermediate 
indices satisfying it appear to be plausible options for empirical research. We have 
revised the centrist measures offered by the literature in order  to check whether they are 
unit-consistent. We have shown that both the class of intermediate inequality indices 
proposed by Bossert-Pfingsten (1990) and those of Kolm (1976) are affected by the 
currency unit. Therefore, only the “fair compromise” index proposed by Krtscha (1994), 
the generalizations proposed by Zheng (2007), and the indices proposed by Del Río and 
Alonso-Villar (2007)—which, as opposed to the others, are ray invariant—are 
intermediate inequality measures satisfying unit consistency. One advantage of the first 
two indices is that they also are decomposable, which can be very helpful for some 
types of empirical analysis.  
 
   12
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